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Executive Summary
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was arguably the most influential piece of
legislation passed to affect the accounting profession. The mandatory regulation caused a great
deal of change for audit firms and the professionals who work there. As a result of this
legislation, auditors have found their roles increasing in responsibility and importance. Auditor’s
competence and capability in adhering to their duty to the public interests are crucial to the
restoration and maintenance of confidence in the profession. SOX was passed to not only protect
investors and public trust in organizations and audit firms, but also to improve the overall audit
quality of financial statement audits. Over the past nearly two decades since SOX was enacted,
the auditor and auditing profession has evolved. The public’s perceptions of auditors and the
profession have improved as a result of major legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. This paper explores the evolution of the auditor and audit profession over the course of
three different time periods to understand the function of the auditor.
This paper is broken down into four major components. First, this paper explores what
led to the need for reform in the auditing world. It discusses the large scandals and audit failures
in the profession that prompted the passage of SOX. Next, this paper examines what exactly the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is. It examines the legislation and highlights the major reforms and
restrictions it enacted on the auditing profession. Then, it discusses how SOX is doing at
meeting its goals and objectives. This paper includes a discussion on how the audit profession
looks years after the passage of such an influential regulation. Finally, the paper addresses the
modern-day auditor and audit profession. This paper also discusses how the public views the
role of the auditor and how SOX contributes to public perceptions. The goal of this paper is to
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examine the evolution of the auditing profession from a period of disappointment and unethical
behavior to its current state of performance.
Pre-SOX Period: The Need for Reform
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted as a result of large corporate scandals.
Failures and scandals in the business world and auditing profession at the start of the twenty-first
century largely disappointed the public. As a result, investors were relying on inaccurate
financial information and making decisions based on deception. Investors lost money due to
major investments in unethical companies and the public lost trust and confidence in the auditors
responsible for uncovering misstatements. One look at the state of the business world during the
pre-SOX era and it was questionable as to how anyone could believe in the auditors and/or the
profession. Major change was needed to demonstrate to the public that scandal to such a large
magnitude would not happen again. In July of 2002, the United States Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in hopes of restoring the profession and the companies to the level of
integrity the public needs for its confidence. However, the passage of such reformative
legislation did not come without a dire need for change. This section of the paper discusses the
increasing state of unethical behavior that large companies and audit firms found themselves in
that led to some of the most unforgettable scandals and failures in the history of the business
world.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, audit firms and the accounting profession
underwent drastic changes that impacted their work and their clients. The major audit firms who
dominated the profession faced a variety of mergers reducing what was once the Big 8 down to
the Big 5. The Big 5 then consisted of Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG, and Price Waterhouse Coopers. Clients and the public looked to external auditors to be
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a second set of eyes to ensure honest and reliable financial information was being produced in
accordance with the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Auditing was the
largest revenue-producing service accounting firms offered to clients up until around the 1980s.
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the entire industry saw a shift as consulting services began to
become an increasingly more important way of producing revenue for audit firms.1 Large
accounting firms formed competitive branches where audit clients began to pay for their
consulting services as well. The two major branches were operating on a fine competitive line as
audit services struggled to remain on top.
The consulting sector of audit firms offered a new form of service for their clients.
Rather than providing reports on financial information, consulting offered clients innovation and
design on how to raise increase their bottom line.2 Consulting services were much different from
audit services, and clients were eager to enhance their companies in new ways. Computer
technology was a hot commodity at the time, and firms seized the opportunity to offer consulting
services on how to digitize company processes in the 1980s.3 As consulting began to provide
new revenue opportunities for audit firms, auditing struggled to remain the number one priority
to these firms. It was crucial during a time of growth in consulting that accounting firms keep
their auditing services their main focus as this service line offered the public and investors the
reasonable assurance they needed to make educated decisions. Clients were paying top dollar for
the services rendered by the Big 5. Big audit firms charged premium audit fees for their services
as they believed clients were paying for their name, reputation, and expertise.4 Given the large
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sense of responsibility on audit firms to deliver a premium service, when the public learned of
audit failure in the early 2000s, the confidence, trust, and reputation of large audit firms in the
accounting profession was tarnished.
The need for regulation and reform in the audit profession came after news of a large
audit failure became public. Capturing the public attention through a variety of audit failures
was Big 5 audit firm Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen appeared to remain a solid staple in the
profession until the early 1990s. Andersen was no exception to the pattern of increasing their
consulting sector. Andersen formally split their branches to run their auditing division under
Arthur Andersen & Company and their consulting division under Andersen Consulting.5
Following the split, Arthur Andersen began to find themselves in some hot water with clients.
The firm was accused in the early 1990s of flawed auditing by multiple clients which caused a
reevaluation by the firm on how to better meet audit client’s needs.6 Part of the issue was that
auditing was taking a back seat for the firm due to consulting’s success in driving up revenues.
The firm needed to reassess its operations to reach a healthy balance between the two divisions.
The business world was changing yet again as deregulation progressed in the audit sector and
companies were testing the boundaries of GAAP to raise their bottom line.7 Auditors’
responsibilities were increasing as they tried to decipher whether companies’ accounting
practices fell within the parameters of GAAP while also competing to remain objective as
consulting services blurred the lines of independence. Arthur Andersen struggled to maintain
auditor objectivity as they experienced the success of consulting on their bottom-line.
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The turn into the twenty-first century led to the collapse of the auditing profession. As
the business world began to crumble, auditor scrutiny became prevalent and brought to light
many issues with Arthur Andersen’s work. The public learned of major scandal and fraud
committed by high-profile companies which Arthur Andersen audited. The companies included
Waste Management, WorldCom, and most famously Enron.8 Arthur Andersen played a role in
the perpetration of fraud by these companies due to faulty audit work. The first of the three
major audit failures Arthur Andersen was a part of was the Waste Management scandal of 1998.
News broke that Arthur Andersen was responsible for signing off on Waste Management’s
financial statements while knowing they were in fact materially misstated.9 During this pre-SOX
era, audit firms were doing what they needed to do to keep their important revenue-driving
clients happy. For Arthur Andersen’s audit of Waste Management, this came in the form of
allowing high thresholds of misstatements to be considered material. In reality, Arthur Andersen
knew the misstatements in Waste Management’s financials were material and led to the
deception of investors. During the pre-SOX era, companies were pressing the lines of GAAP
interpretations as deregulation placed the responsibility on the auditor to decipher if decisions
fell in the realm of GAAP. Andersen failed to properly decipher the misstatement threshold in
hopes of keeping their client satisfied. Arthur Andersen’s role in the Waste Management failures
shed light on deficiencies in the regulation of the auditing profession; however, it was
Andersen’s role in the Enron scandal that led to the collapse of the firm and a rock bottom point
for the profession.
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Enron was a complex company for the auditors of Arthur Andersen’s Houston office.
The company was involved in a variety of markets and operated in such a way that business
fraud was able to flourish. Enron utilized Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to fraudulently raise
revenue by selling services to its own SPEs and improperly recognize the transaction as
revenue.10 Arthur Andersen failed to address the improper accounting treatment with Enron. In
fact, Arthur Andersen’s audit team assigned to Enron was involved in working with Enron to
hide losses from investors. David Duncan was a partner at Arthur Andersen assigned to the
Enron audit who overruled staff members’ concerns on problematic accounting practices.11
Andersen issued an unqualified opinion on Enron’s financial statements despite engagement
team member’s concern for their GAAP interpretation. As a result of Arthur Andersen’s role in
the fraud, Enron was able to get away with improper accounting practices and disclosures in an
effort to appear more profitable to investors. Once the SEC investigation of Enron began, Arthur
Andersen took action to attempt to cover their tracks in the perpetration of fraud.12
Following the disclosure that the SEC would be investigating Enron, Arthur Andersen
went into a panicked state. In the days following, the Houston office shredded and disposed of
e-mails and documents that alluded to their knowledge and role in the fraud.13 At this point, the
firm and SEC knew it would be a long way back for Andersen to regain public trust. While
Enron was collapsing Arthur Andersen, it was Andersen’s role in the WorldCom scandal of 2002
that ruined any hope for a rebound back to a respected place in the accounting world. Around
the same time, news broke of yet another scandal in which Arthur Andersen failed to correct
WorldCom’s aggressive GAAP interpretation. WorldCom was incorrectly classifying its assets;
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in turn, the company was overstating its revenue.14 The WorldCom and Arthur Andersen
scandal further uncovered the need for guidance on proper GAAP interpretation as auditors may
lack the necessary competence to exercise professional judgement. Other Arthur Andersen
clients faced the repercussions of their auditor’s actions as they began experiencing negative
returns just days following news blasts of Andersen’s unethical behavior.15 Companies were
being punished through negative returns as a result of their auditors. The negative effects ethical
clients faced showed the interconnectedness of the auditing profession.
The profession needed to make a change as the actions of one firm could tarnish the trust
in the profession as a whole, which is what happened for many years to come following these
years of enormous scandal. Investors lost billions of dollars from the lack of due diligence by
the auditors. Auditors during this period faced immense responsibility to offer the proper
discretion on GAAP interpretations. Each time they fell short, the public lost trust in the work
they were performing. Auditors were self-regulated and failed to remain loyal to the public as
consulting pressures took over. The firms that dominated the profession, primarily the Big 5,
were losing sight of their loyalty and pressured their auditors to satisfy clients who provided a lot
of revenue to the firm. Ultimately, this version of the auditor would not suffice at meeting the
needs of the public. Arthur Andersen fell due to their unethical behavior, the Big 5 became the
Big 4, and it was evident that it was time for a new era of regulation and legislation in the
accounting profession.16
Implementation Period: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

14

Cullinan, “Enron as a Symptom of Audit Process Breakdown,” 860.
Linthicum, Reitenga, and Sanchez, “Social Responsibility and Corporate Reputation,” 175.
16
Cullinan, “Enron as a Symptom of Audit Process Breakdown,” 860.
15

9
A glimpse of hope for the business world finally broke the news after years of
disappointment and collapse with the passage of one of the most significant pieces of legislation
to ever affect the accounting profession. In July of 2002, the US Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) in an attempt to restore the business world to a place of integrity. After years
of deregulation in the accounting profession and immense responsibility being placed on auditor
discretion, SOX provided the necessary regulation and guidance to reshape the business world.
From the outset, the legislation was mandatory and must be followed by all public companies.
SOX addresses deficiencies in both public companies and public accounting firms and hopes to
correct areas of weakness in order to regain investor confidence. SOX includes nine different
sections of mandates. This section of the paper will discuss the goals that SOX attempts to meet.
While SOX contains guidance on a wide variety of issues, this paper will focus on only a few of
its major provisions that aid in the illustration of the evolution of the auditor and audit profession
including the creation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
restrictions on services that inhibit auditor independence, and the guidance on Internal Controls
over Financial Reporting (ICFR).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed to meet a variety of objectives. After the
immense scandals by large companies and accounting firms, the public looked at the business
world through disappointed and skeptical eyes. It was evident from the disastrous effects on
investors that the auditing profession was not performing as intended. To combat these
perceptions, SOX aims at protecting the public and restoring investor trust in companies.17
Auditor’s loyalty should always lie with the public. Unfortunately, the auditors involved in the
large corporate scandals of the early 2000s failed to do their duty in the eyes of the public. As a
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result, investors paid the price by losing billions of dollars. One of the main objectives of SOX
is to make investors and the public feel protected so they can regain confidence in financial
reporting. Another objective is to improve audit quality through auditor independence efforts.18
Auditing took a back seat to non-audit services in the late twentieth century, and in return, the
quality of audits was compromised. SOX attempts to bring auditing back to the forefront of the
firm’s priorities. Given the period preceding this legislation, one of SOX’s main goals, in
conjunction with improved audit quality, is to reduce fraud.19 As a whole, SOX tries to improve
the clarity of communication among the auditors, the financial information they audit, and the
users of this information. SOX allows users to believe in auditor’s work through improved audit
quality by requiring increased independence measures.
In order to meet these objectives, SOX needed to restructure the world of auditing. One
of the first ways it does so is through the creation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB).20 Prior to SOX, audit firms were self-regulated. The self-regulation was not
succeeding at holding auditors accountable. Therefore, the PCAOB was created to keep public
companies and auditors in check. It is unique from any prior regulatory measure in place to
oversee the work of auditors. The PCAOB is a separate, non-profit corporation that is given the
legal power to superintend public auditors.21 It is an innovative way to regulate public auditors
that was drastically different from any measure implemented in the past. It is intended to create
and adopt standards on auditing, provide quality control over audits through inspections, monitor
ethical measures of auditors to public companies, and discipline audit firms when necessary.22
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The creation of an oversight board helps auditors and companies operate with the mindset that
they are being watched and inspected. This entity is designed to remain separate and
independent from audit firms. The make-up of the PCAOB board includes five members; two
members of the board must be auditors to offer the necessary expertise on the audit process
needed to properly set standards and inspect audit reports, and three members are independent of
the accounting profession.23 The design of the board helps rebuild the trust lost by the public by
ensuring that the watchdog of the profession is not only qualified but objective and independent.
The PCAOB helps meet the objective of improved audit quality by setting standards that audit
reports must meet.
Auditor independence was largely compromised as the consulting sector of accounting
firms rapidly grew as a source of revenue. One may conclude that as revenue from non-audit
services increased and firms began having an internal battle for client revenue between divisions,
audit quality became compromised. SOX implementation helps promote auditor independence
measures. One of the ways in which the legislation strives to do so is by placing restrictions on
non-audit services offered by firms to audit clients. SOX outlines the scope of acceptable nonaudit services that firms can provide and issues disclosure requirements for audit fees and any
non-audit services provided.24 Transparency with the public is crucial for improving investor
confidence and trust. The profession needed guided restriction on the fine line they were
previously walking between prioritizing audit work and offering non-audit services that were
proving to drastically increase their revenue. Two of the new restrictions SOX implemented
include banning the design of a client’s information system and restricting audit firms from
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auditing clients whose internal personnel were former employees of the audit firm during the
preceding audit cycle.25 Both of these situations run the risk of compromising auditor
independence as they would be in the position of auditing their own design and/or working with
former coworkers who may know too much about the audit process. Non-audit services blur the
lines of independence as client-firm relationships become more dependent on one another to
raise revenue. The restrictions SOX places on these services aim to keep a clear boundary in
place for auditors to improve their quality of work and remain independent from clients.
To fully meet the objectives in place, SOX needed to address issues from the inside out.
Internally, many companies lacked the proper controls and disclosures to reduce the risk of
fraud. SOX mandated legislation around companies’ Internal Controls over Financial Reporting
(ICFR) and the roles both management and auditors must play in ensuring proper control
systems are in place and disclosing any areas of weakness.26 SOX does not outline the proper
control system to put in place or what should be included in an effective control system; there is
no one system or template of a control system that would mold to all companies’ needs. Rather,
SOX legislates on management being held responsible for disclosing that controls are in place
and where they might be falling short. External auditors then disclose whether they agree or
disagree with management’s assertions on controls. The two sections that address ICFR are
Section 302 and Section 404. Section 302 requires that management annually and quarterly
disclose their perceived effectiveness of internal controls.27 Within the parameters of Section
302, the testing of controls is not required. Most of the work conducted to meet the requirements
of this section happens through discussion with internal client personnel, assessment of designs,
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and walk-throughs.28 Section 404 is more extensive. Section 404 mandates on the testing of
controls; management and auditors must annually evaluate both the design and effectiveness of
ICFR.29 Section 404 gets down to the account and assertion level. The audit work under this
section is tailored to the company’s needs to areas where more testing would be efficient. Both
sections strive to meet SOX objectives of improving audit quality and providing investors and
the public with trustworthy financial information.30
Sarbanes-Oxley is an extensive piece of legislation. The legislation set goals and
objectives aimed at righting the wrongs in the business world. SOX was the first step in setting
auditors up for success. The guidelines and restrictions help allow auditors to properly do their
jobs and not succumb to pressures from their own firms or clients. The passage of SOX helped
lay the foundation for the true role of an auditor. Pre-SOX auditors found themselves
responsible for much more outside of their job role. Unfortunately, they were unable to succeed
due to the added expectations clients and firms placed upon them. This made them appear
unable to properly do their jobs. In reality, they were faced with unnecessary pressures and
responsibilities that did not allow them to do what they were intended to do. SOX redirects
auditor responsibility through regulation and reform to afford auditors the tools and resources
they need to perform their duties.
Post-SOX Period: Changes as a Result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The US Congress passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can only do so much. Once
the legislation passed, the duty fell onto the business world and the auditing profession to carry
out the regulation accordingly. The legislation is only effective at meeting its purpose if auditors
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and business professionals do their part to follow the regulation. Constant reassessment of the
business world at large is required to ensure SOX is meeting its goals and objectives. SOX
added increased requirements and responsibilities for auditors; firms had to reassess the best use
of company resources and make adjustments accordingly. While SOX was a promising piece
legislation with high hopes of eliminating fraud and enhancing integrity in business reporting,
the legislation still faced its fair share of criticism. Implementation of provisions under the
legislation resulted in increased costs for firms. Many companies, audit firms, and investors
have questioned whether the benefits of SOX truly outweigh the costs. Assessment of the
effectiveness of SOX can be difficult to quantify, however, many studies have completed
comparisons to show improvements. This paper will focus on examining trends in the decade
post-SOX to assess how SOX is shaping the auditor’s role in the audit process. In order to do so,
various studies are used to compare pre-SOX data with post-SOX data in order to assess the
effectiveness of the legislation. This section of the paper looks at trends and controversy
following the implementation of SOX specifically in regard to the restrictions placed on nonaudit services and improvements in the ICFR.
Pre-SOX, audit firm and client relationships were teetering on a fine line. Dishonesty
and deception on behalf of the client or audit firm caused a lot of firms to reevaluate their clients
and vice versa. The perfect time for a fresh start came following the passage of SOX. The
relationship between an auditor and their client is a two-sided relationship. The audit market is a
highly competitive market that involves selectivity, strategy, and competitiveness, all of which
can compromise auditor independence and audit quality.31 The passage of SOX caused a shift in
the audit market as the restrictions on non-audit services were put in place. It allowed for audit
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firms and clients to fresh, and for many companies that came in the form of auditor resignations
or client dismissals of auditors. During the implementation of SOX, the Big 4 resignation rates
were the highest relative to pre-SOX and post-SOX periods.32 The rise in resignations alludes to
the need for auditors to be selective. SOX increases requirements for auditors such as increased
documentation for PCAOB inspection. Audit firms must decide the best usage of firm resources
and be reasonable with auditor’s time. In the past, resignations from the audit firms and
dismissals on behalf of the client usually occurred when conflict arose and an agreement on an
issue could not be met. When the firms and clients could not reach an agreement, typically one
would walk away from the relationship. However, post-SOX, there has been a decline in both
resignations and dismissals.33 These findings are optimistic about better relationships between
auditors and their clients and less controversial disagreements. Rather than audit firms taking on
as many clients as possible and offering a realm of services to raise revenue, SOX prompted the
audit world to promote selectivity and optimize company resources and auditors’ time.
While the restrictions on non-audit services showed positive trends in an improved audit
firm and client relationships, these restrictions did not come without controversy. There is an
ongoing debate around whether non-audit services actually enhance the audit process versus
compromise audit independence. Given the correlation between increased non-audit services
and large corporate scandals in the early 2000s, much of the public and investors believed there
to be a clear answer to that debate. However, the debate aids in the discussion of the evolution
of the auditor and audit profession and is worth mentioning. One side of the argument is
congruent with the goals of SOX. Restrictions were placed on non-audit services because
auditor independence was being compromised. Audit firms are a business, and businesses can
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only operate when they are producing enough revenue to supply the resources necessary to
function. Non-audit services proved to be a successful way for audit firms to increase revenue.
As a result, accounting firms were forced to deal with a dilemma and decide whether the audit
function should remain the first priority. The auditor’s responsibility is to accurate report to the
public, but non-audit services can shift an increased level of loyalty to the client. In turn, this
placed added pressures on the auditors as clients became more dependent on the auditor’s
loyalty.34 On the other side of the debate, critics of SOX believe the restrictions placed on nonaudit services are too strict. Critics see non-audit services not only as a valuable way for firms to
increase revenue but as a way for auditors to gain a better understanding of the client’s system;
in return, because they have increased knowledge on where to identify issues, auditors are
improving the quality of their audit by more efficiently allocating their time.35 Non-audit
services are believed to allow auditors to complete their work more efficiently and allow firms to
more effectively utilize their resources. Both sides of the debate offer relevant arguments.
Although, a better understanding of the client environment can be achieved through non-audit
services, the auditor’s loyalty should always be focused on the public interest. If firms and the
public want auditors to successfully perform their jobs, any added pressures that could interfere
with their duties should be avoided.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated that management and external auditors separately
assess the effectiveness of ICFR and disclose their conclusions under Section 404. Section 404
is said to require more thorough audit work than Section 302. Therefore, it is believed to be a
better judge at discerning the effectiveness of SOX. Section 404 went into effect on November
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15, 2004 for accelerated filers.36 The two year wait period for the implementation of Section 404
occurred after concerns and pressures were placed on the SEC. Being that Section 404 is more
extensive, firms needed to invest more resources and time to effectively carry out the legislation.
This caused an economic burden on many firms, especially smaller audit firms who did not pull
the same amount of capital as the Big 4. In 2006, two years after Section 404 became effective,
a survey conducted of 321 companies concluded that the average compliance cost of Section 404
was around $1.5 million in additional audit fees.37 Firms faced immense amounts of stress as
they needed to invest millions of dollars and time into compliance with legislation that also
placed restrictions and required cutbacks on their other revenue-producing services.
Unfortunately, for small audit firms, Section 404 did not include cost scaling of requirements to
address differences in capital availability based on firm size. Section 404 not only imposed
physical costs on audit firms, but it also imposed opportunity costs for auditors as they adjusted
to new time-consuming requirements.38 Auditor responsibility shifted as this area of SOX
became increasingly important. A discussion of whether the benefits of Section 404 outweigh
the costs was an important debate in the years following compliance. While difficult to quantify,
research alludes to Section 404 being crucial to meeting the objectives of SOX.
Compliance with Section 404 offered both short-term and long-term benefits to audit
firms and companies despite the hefty costs of implementation. While Section 302 increases the
emphasis on ICFR, it is not adequate on its own to maximize efforts to improve audit quality and
boost investor trust. In the beginning months following the compliance with Section 404, it was
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reported that 95% of companies indorsed their controls effective under Section 302 while
reporting control deficiencies through Section 404.39 Section 404 brings to light deficiencies in
the control environment through its extensive testing and documentation requirements. It
highlights details that Section 302 does not, namely providing investors with more reliable and
relevant information to make decisions. A study published in the Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance attempted to evaluate the benefits companies and firms receive by
complying with Section 404. The study utilized US-listed Canadian firms who, under Canadian
regulation similar to SOX, did not have to comply with similar requirements to Section 404 to
act as a control group to firms who implemented compliance with Section 404.40 The study
concluded that earnings reliability and relevance improved as a result of Section 404 procedures
as a decrease in abnormalities was occurring at a much faster rate than non-complying firms.41
The goals of Section 404 include more reliable information for investors and less material
misstatements. Both audit firms and companies, through compliance with Section 404, were
helping to restore investor and public confidence in financial reporting. Section 404 gives
auditors and management the platform to be more transparent in regard to their control
environment. In return, investors are given a more holistic view of an organization. In the long
run, Section 404 is crucial to more reliable, relevant, and transparent financial information and
the rebuilding of firm and company reputation.
The effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act greatly impacted auditors and audit firms. When
the legislation was published, there was only so much telling as to how it would change the role
of the auditor. It was not until years later when reassessments of the business and audit
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environment could be conducted that it became clear how auditors and the audit profession were
evolving. Not only did assessments of its effectiveness give insight into how effective SOX was
at meeting its objectives, but these assessments help to allude how this legislation shaped auditor
duties and responsibilities. SOX mandated new restrictions and requirements which adjusted the
way auditors allocated their time. The restrictions on non-audit services forced audit firms to be
more selective with the clients they continued to work with and the new clients they accepted.42
These restrictions forced audit firms to remove some of the added pressures they placed on
auditors to issue opinions on financial statements that would keep their important, revenueproducing clients satisfied. SOX’s restrictions opened a new door for auditors to more
effectively perform their duties by, through indirect means, more clearly defining their role and
allowing them to work toward the goal of improving audit quality. The increased legislation on
ICFR is one of the components of SOX that evolved auditor’s responsibility the most. ICFR is
crucial to meeting the initiative of improving investor and public trust, and sections of SOX such
as Section 302 and 404 require more detailed work on behalf of auditors. It is an area in which
auditors must dedicate considerable time to perform the necessary procedures and testing
required to disclose their opinion on the effectiveness of the control environment of their client.
This section required audit firms to invest resources, capital, and time appropriately as a result.43
The compliance with these sections and SOX as a whole pointed audit firms and auditors in the
direction of what is most important.
The Role of the Auditor and Audit Profession
Being an auditor and working within the audit profession is an important role with a large
level of responsibility. People base major financial decisions on the financial statements which
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auditors express their opinions. Auditors and the profession have come a long way since their
role in the large corporate scandals of the early 2000s. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 helped
set auditors and audit firms up for success; SOX helps auditors and firms remain focused on
fulfilling their responsibilities to the public by mitigating added pressures and providing
necessary regulation over the profession.44 However, many people are misinformed about the
duties of an auditor. Over time, people have formed perceptions and expectations about an
auditor’s role and the audit profession in general based largely heavily upon media and news
stories. People are often disappointed in the profession because they lack proper education and
knowledge of what an auditor is expected to do. The progression of this paper was intended to
lay the foundation for how an auditor’s role has evolved over three prominent time periods for
the profession; the goal is to fill the gap in research on how an auditor’s purpose and
responsibilities have evolved to the point they are today. The final section of this paper
examines the current state of the audit profession. This section contends that the profession will
continue to be perceived negatively and disappoint the public unless there is ample knowledge
and education on the role auditors play in the business environment. The final section includes a
discussion on the lack of public knowledge of SOX, the expectations gap that exists between the
public and auditors, and finally, the true role of an auditor and the audit profession.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 drastically changed the profession and business world;
this legislation is described as being one of the most significant changes to the accounting
profession. One of the goals of SOX is to improve audit quality in order to improve public and
investor confidence. The legislation helps redefine the profession and ensure accuracy and
integrity for the public interest. However, the public can only judge whether SOX has met its
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objectives if they are educated on the legislation and fully understand its design and purpose.
There is a deficiency in knowledge by a large portion of the public on what SOX is and how
effective it is at meeting its objectives, and in turn, there is a lack of knowledge on the auditor’s
role in the audit process. Investors are able to recognize that SOX played a role in changing
audit responsibilities, in turn, improving the overall quality and integrity of audits.45 Despite not
knowing all the details of the legislation, the name is recognizable and often associated with
increased auditor responsibilities. However, it is the extent to which they believe audit
responsibilities have changed which is problematic. Audit professionals with post-SOX realworld experience report lower levels of perceived improvement in audit quality than auditors
with no audit experience.46 Experienced professionals, while still believing SOX has improved
audit quality, are more realistic in deciphering how significant the improvement is. While it is
important that investors and the public understand that SOX is acheiving its purpose, the
overconfidence of investors may lead to another period of disappointment. If investors associate
SOX with improving audit quality through increasing auditor responsibilities, investors may be
much more likely to place all the pressure on auditors to meet their desired improvements in
audits.47 Without adequate knowledge of SOX and the role of an auditor, investors risk
believing that auditors are performing responsibilities that they are not. Familiarity of SOX and
the audit process needs to be a priority for investors as well as the public because the reach of the
business world processes can affect everyone. When investors are not fully aware of audit
process regulation, the gap in the expectations for auditors and the audit profession widens.

45

Brown and Jones, 62.
Brown and Jones, 62.
47
Brown and Jones, 63.
46

22
Therefore, this places undo blame on auditors when companies fall short and audits misrepresent
financial position.
The expectations gap is a large problem in the misconception of the auditor. The
expectations gap refers to the gap between the expectations set by the users of financial
information and the expectations set by auditors.48 Investors and the public who utilize audited
financial information to make educated decisions have an expectation for what is considered to
be satisfactory in the responsibilities of auditors and the procedures and results of the audit
process. Auditors, however, have different expectations for the work they complete throughout
the audit process and what is considered to be satisfactory. The gap forms as a result of
knowledge deficiencies in investors about what an auditor is expected to do during the audit
process.49 As the gap widens, investor confidence and trust in auditors diminishes. The
expectations gap has been an ongoing phenomenon for years. Users of financial data expect
auditors to act with their upmost integrity, competence, and capability to issue a fully accurate
and independent opinion assuring the users that the financial information that is free of material
misstatements.50 While auditors should always complete their audit work with their upmost
integrity, competence, and capabilities, the audit process is not black and white. Investors who
do not fully understand the audit profession and the work and professional discretion that
auditors must exercise during an audit usually have unrealistic expectations.
The roles and responsibilities of an auditor are important to the function of the economic
world. An auditor’s role in society, defined by the American Institute of Certified Public
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Accountants (AIPCA), is defined as “commitment to objectivity, integrity, competence;
excellent performance on behalf of clients, employers, and the public; and accountability for the
highest professional and business ethics.”51 An auditor adds to society by serving as a moral
compass, directing companies’ financial information and disclosures in an ethical direction.
Their loyalty lies with the public, not the client or their respective firm, as they issue opinions
with the public and investors’ best interests in mind. As a result of SOX, auditors audit both a
company’s financial data and the internal control environment that they produce this data within.
Auditors do not provide one hundred percent assurance that financial information is free from
material misstatements. No auditor has the time to test every single transaction made by a
company; it is unrealistic. Rather, auditors provide reasonable assurance.52 When investors
believe auditors’ opinions ensure them of complete accuracy, they are contributing to the
expectations gap and holding auditors to a standard they will never be able to meet. Auditors
only test a sample of transactions. Based upon the results from the procedures and testing
conducted on the sample, auditors are able to issue an opinion with reasonable assurance on
whether financial statements are free from material misstatements.53
Auditors are required to exercise professional skepticism and judgment on accounting
practices and treatment that need GAAP interpretation. While SOX and other regulations have
reduced some of the responsibilities of auditors to properly discern interpretations, accounting
and auditing have grey areas that require professional judgement.54 Auditors offer the necessary
competence and capability to determine if practices are in accordance with GAAP. An auditor’s
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job is not to specifically seek out fraud or illegal activity within a company.55 An auditor’s role
is to express an independent and objective opinion on whether a company’s financial information
provides a proper depiction of the company and is free from material misstatements.56 Setting
incorrect expectations makes auditors appear that they failed at their job when news hits the
media about fraudulent behavior on behalf of companies. Companies have their own duties to
operate ethically and accurately. Management’s manipulation of accounting policies and
perpetration of fraud can disrupt and taint the audit process.57 Unfortunately, companies acting
unethically is never going to go away. However, auditors improve audit quality when they
uncover fraudulent or illegal behavior through the audit process of testing and procedures and
accordingly issue an appropriate opinion.58
The audit profession as a whole is often misunderstood. Audit firms are businesses that
need revenue to effectively provide the necessary resources to operate. Like any business, audit
firms place pressures on their employees to keep clients satisfied, so revenue continues to grow.
This puts auditors in a tough place because unique to most other professions, the audit profession
has a duty to the public versus their company or their clients.59 SOX helps restrict some of the
pressures that firms place on their employees by imposing restrictions on services to keep
auditors independent from their clients. This keeps the profession on track to prioritizing
auditing and the public. Investors and the public need to keep in mind that an audit firms’
greatest assets are their employees. Auditors and employees at accounting firms are human; with
a human-operated business, there is always going to be a risk of human error. The public often
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loses confidence in the profession when auditors make errors. However, these errors are
inevitable. The auditing profession cannot operate without risk. While the profession works
diligently to provide their auditors with the resources, tools, and training necessary to diminish
the probability of error, audit risk is never going to go away completely. If investors and the
public want auditors to better plan the audit process to prevent errors and detect fraud, audit
firms have a responsibility to provide the proper training and tools for the auditors.60
The audit profession assigns much of the revenue and profit they earn from their services
into tools such as software development and training that allows auditors to perform their jobs
more efficiently and accurately. The revenue is derived from services rendered to clients. The
profession walks a fine line with its desire to satisfy clients and increase revenue while, at the
same time, minimizing pressures on auditors to satisfy clients through compromised integrity.61
Because audit firms are structured through a hierarchical system, the partners at the firm have
added pressures to maintain revenue from their clients while upholding their reputation.62 In
turn, they place pressure on inexperienced, young staff who frequently are the individuals
performing audit process procedures. The audit profession is still new relative to other
professions; the profession lacks an agreed upon global accounting framework to aid the
structuring of firms’ duties and responsibilities.63 With firms adding new service lines, the
profession is still navigating new territories and balancing their divisions.
No legislation can ensure auditors are competent and capable of meeting their purpose.
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 helps guide and restrict the profession to operate at its
maximum capabilities, the profession is responsible for hiring ethical auditors and investing in
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training its employees. The auditing profession has its own duty to constantly enhance their
auditors’ competence and capabilities by providing them with the necessary resources and
environment to accomplish the duties of an auditor.64 Despite the large strides over the past two
decades, the audit profession still faces criticism. The criticism affects the credibility and trust
the audit profession has worked diligently to restore.65 The public scrutinizes the profession for
failing to reform the industry based upon recommendations by regulatory bodies that were
offered years ago. Audit firms face judgement for ongoing issues with independence,
transparency, independent governance, and quality.66 While the profession has experienced great
reform, investors and the public continue to push the profession to address problems within these
areas to better meet the needs of financial users.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to lay the foundation for a discussion of the role of the auditor
and what the audit profession is expected to accomplish. The audit profession has made great
strides over the previous two decades. The profession entered into the 2000s with the collapse of
one of its five largest accounting/audit firms. The public and investment community lost their
trust and confidence in the profession as a whole as a result of the large corporate scandals and
audit failures occurring at that time. With the rise of new revenue-producing services secured by
accounting firms, auditors were placed in the middle of a revenue versus independence dilemma
and lacked the tools to properly remain independent and objective. The profession needed
reform and regulation if it had any hope of restoring the public trust. To help minimize
fraudulent reporting practices and material misstatements, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act of 2002. The legislation mandated many stipulations on the business world and the
audit process. SOX is designed to eliminate fraud and misrepresentation of financial data. The
regulations and guidance offered under SOX expanded auditors’ duties and responsibilities and
imposed more stringent interorganizational controls.
The implementation of SOX allowed for a reassessment of the audit profession and the
provision for stricter financial governance and controls. Years following the passage of SOX,
assessments on its effectiveness have shown the progression of the audit profession and the work
and responsibilities of auditors. While SOX was proving to be successful at meeting its
objectives, the lack of knowledge on SOX’s legislation by the general public has been
detrimental to the perceived success and reputation of the auditor. This paper discussed how
public misconceptions about auditors can set auditors up to fail; the public is unrealistic in their
understanding of the auditors’ responsibilities and therefore frequently has unrealistic
expectations and misunderstandings. The auditor’s role and accuracy are important to the firm,
the investor, and the general public, but in many instances, due to lack of understanding, the
expectations of the outsiders are excessive. Audit firms operate as businesses, and therefore, the
profession has a duty to enable their auditors to be as successful as possible by extensively
training them to fulfill their role in the business environment. The pressure exerted on the
auditor from multiple entities makes it difficult to please the public, the investor, the client, and
the firm simultaneously. The profession continues to undergo criticism and pressure to reform in
order to better demonstrate to the public that there are proper checks and balances in place to
ensure the integrity of financial information. A fundamental objective of this paper was to better
understand the role of the auditor and the auditing profession. For preservation of public trust,
the auditor constantly examines the effectiveness of interorganizational controls the ensure the
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accuracy and integrity of financial statements. In conclusion, the credibility of the auditor and
the audit process will be based on the perception of the independence of judgement and the track
record of their accuracy.
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